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Germany’s Challenge to the Monroe Doctrine
At the turn of the century: migration, the cases of
Venezuela and Haiti
Par Marilyn SEPHOCLE
Introduction
The following is a letter dated December 16, 1901 and addressed
to an official of the German Embassy in Washington by a high-ranking
official of the State Department:
The President in his message of the 3rd of December 1901 used
the following language:
“The Monroe Doctrine is a declaration that there must be no
territorial aggrandizement by any non American power on American
soil. It is in no wise intended as hostile to any nation in the Old
World”. The President further said : “This Doctrine has nothing to do
with the commercial relations of any American power, save that it in
truth allows each of them to form such as it desires. We do not
guarantee any state against punishment if it misconducts itself,
provided that punishment does not take the form of the acquisition of
territory by any non American power”.
His Excellency the German Ambassador on his recent return
from Berlin, conveyed personally to the President the assurance of the
German Emperor that his Majesty’s government has no purpose or
intention to make even the smallest acquisition of territory on the
South American Continent or the adjacent islands. This voluntary and
friendly declaration was afterwards repeated by the Secretary of State,
and was received by the President and the people of the United States
in the frank and cordial spirit in which it was offered. In the
memorandum of the 11th of December, his Excellency the German
Ambassador repeats these assurances as follows : “We declare
especially that under no circumstances do we consider in our
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proceedings the acquisition or the permanent occupation of
Venezuelan territory”.
In the aforementioned memorandum of the 11th of December,
the German Government informed that of the United States that it has
certain just claims for money and for damages wrongfully withheld
from German subjects by the government of Venezuela and that it
proposes to take certain coercive measures described in the
memorandum to enforce payment of these just claims.
The President of the United States appreciating the courtesy of
the German Government in making him acquainted with the state of
affairs referred to, and not regarding himself as called upon to enter
into the consideration of the claims in question, believes that no
measures will be taken in this matter by agents of the German
government, which are not in accordance with the well-known purpose
above set forth, of His Majesty the German Emperor.
In his letter dated December 23, 1901 addressed to the German
Emperor, Admiral von Dietrichs of the German Marine writes at length
about the use of the “Vineta”, the “Falke” and the “Gazelle”, three
German warships on the Venezuelan coast. According to the beginning
of the letter the three warships would be used to defend German
interests in Venezuela. At the end of the letter however von Dietrichs
mentions the eventual use of six other warships, the “Victoria Louise”,
the “Amazone”, the “Niebe”, the “Hela”, the “Zieten” and the
“Hagen”. According to the German Admiral these could be used in the
event of what he describes as a “Strengthening of Germany’s relations
with Venezuela” or as a “Possible necessary confrontation with the
Venezuelan government”.
What led to this confrontation ? In this paper we shall examine
the Germany’s role in Central America, particularly in Haiti and
Venezuela at the turn of the century in light of Germany’s opposition
to the Monroe Doctrine.
Germany’s navy and colonial societies
At the turn of the century Germany had its own brand of
imperialism. German imperialism was rooted in the Wilhelminian
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Weltpolitik and in neo-mercantilism. At the time, foreign policy
makers in Germany used a gamut of tools to support imperialism. One
of them was a fleet of ships doing maneuvers in the Caribbean basin
and reporting regularly to their government. A second tool was the
proliferation of German colonial societies. Usually, upon their
retirement these same officers would later join such pro-imperialist
lobbies as the “pan-German league” or “the colonial league”. The third
tool was emigration. Emigration was backed by the establishment of
German schools and churches. Religion, however, failed to attract
followers. Most of the Germans residing in Venezuela and Haiti had
either embraced the Catholic faith or were non-practicing Protestants.
Even after its unification, Germany remained essentially a
middle European nation, non-threatening to its nine neighbors.
Germany was until the 1880s not extremely militarily oriented.
But that was about to change : in the 1890s a military culture
developed. General Alfred von Schlieffen and General von Tirpitz
embodied the new German military power. Admiral von Tirpitz (1849-
1930) was the father of the German marine. Although he did not
articulate a clear policy for Germany in terms of its new aspirations on
the world stage, he was convinced of that an impressive fleet would
win his country, the respect of its neighbors and would be a war
deterrent. The cult of the uniform, the expansion of the navy which
became second only to that of Great Britain, the founding of such
institutions as the “Deutsche Flottenverein” (1898), the
“Kolonialverein”, the “Alldeutsche Verband” marked the new German
Weltpolitik. Germany was far more active in Africa where it had
acquired Cameroon, Zanzibar, Togo, Southwest Africa. In Latin
America and the Caribbean, the Reich was banking more on
establishing a strong presence, strengthening the already settled
German colonies and sending new groups of Germans to places like
Venezuela where settlements such as “la Colonia Tovar” were already
in their second or third generation. In Haiti a relatively large
community of German merchants played an important role in the
island’s economy.
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Germany’s New Markets in Latin America and the Caribbean
Already in 1847, Germany had 162 consulates in Latin America
and in the Caribbean. As early as 1827, Germany had appointed Georg
Gramlich as its first Consul to Guaira, Venezuela. This first step in
diplomatic relations between Germany and Venezuela was followed
10 years later by the Treaty of Commerce and Trade. This major
historical event steadily increased the sale of German goods to
Venezuela. Until the 1850s, Germany’s adventures in Latin America
and the Caribbean represented no challenge to the Monroe Doctrine.
One culmination point in the establishment of new found
markets was the founding on the 27th of May 1847 (date of the 10th
anniversary of the Treaty of Commerce) of the “Hamburg-
Amerikanische-Packeffahrt-Aktiengesellschaft” (HAPAG). This
association was the work of 33 enterprising businessmen from
Hamburg under the stewardship of August Bolten, an influential
shipbroker. It increased from 5 to 32 the number of German boats in
Venezuelan waters, thus contributing significantly to German trade. In
1874, HAPAG also took on the role of postal service for the entire
region of the Caribbean, becoming the most efficient postal service
until 1879. What had begun as a German venture to the Americas to
New York and Venezuela constituted in 1871 a large percentage of
Germany’s foreign exports reaching 33 harbors in the Americas along
the Atlantic coast.
One of the major trading nations of the end of the 19th century,
the German empire exported high value-added goods at a faster rate
than it imported such goods as tobacco, leather, copper, zinc and other
minerals, cotton, cocoa; thus contributing to a healthy 4,5 % annual
industrial growth rate maintained between 1866 and 1872 and again
between 1890 and 1913. At the turn of the century, between 1890 and
1904, Germany’s foreign trade had increased by 66 %, which was the
highest foreign trade increase in the world. The United States took a
close second place in trade increase with a 59 % increase for the same
period. According to the German Imperial Navy Office, German
investments in Central and Latin America exceeded the amount of
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German investment in North America. Of the 7,735 million Mark
invested overseas in 1898, 1,200 million were invested in Central
America and the Caribbean and approximately 400 million Mark were
invested in South America, and 1,200 million Mark in the Eastern part
of the continent while approximately 2,000 million Mark were placed
in North America and Canada.
These German Venezuelan relations that had started on a rather
positive footing started to sour very quickly as early as 1851 when the
Venezuelan government rescinded the Trade treaty, due in part to the
disturbances that existed in Venezuela at the time.
Monroe Doctrine of December 2, 1823 and Gustav Schmoller’s
reaction
After 1871 emboldened by a strong economy and feeling the
need to expand and to rival other European powers particularly Great
Britain, Germany began to dream of an empire beyond its European
borders.
“In the coming century we must desire at all casts a German
colony of some 20 to 30 millions people in South America. This is
impossible without warships, which provide secured maritime
communications and a presence backed by force” said the German
economist Gustav Schmoller in 1900. Such statements were in direct
opposition to the Monroe Doctrine which had self-appointed the
United States of America as the sole gendarme of the region.
Colonizing South America : an old German Dream
As early as 1528 some “Germans” had their eyes set on
Venezuela or “little Venice”. The financial house of Weiser (one of the
financial tycoons that financed the slave trade) was granted permission
by Emperor Charles V to colonize Venezuela. Ambrosius Dalfinger,
Nikolaus Federmann, Franz Lebzelter, Sebastian Rentz, Hieronymus
Sayier and Georg Speyer were among the notables from the city of
Ulm who set out for the adventure. Twenty-seven years later the
aspirations of the Weiser House were brought to a halt by the Spanish.
This did not prevent the German financial houses of Welser and Fulda
to participate on a financial basis to the slave trade, particularly on the
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Dutch side. The enterprise was particularly lucrative in Surinam where
the interests they earned were rather high.
From Dream to Reality
It is not until the 19th century that the Germans began to dream
again of Latin America. Germany shifted completely its emigration
policy from heavy taxation of candidates to emigration to “unfettered
and untaxed” emigration. The state of Baden took the lead in relaxing
emigration policy. Between 1840 and 1849 Baden seven subsidized the
emigration of farmers. It is during that era that a number of German
settlements sprung up in Latin America. Blumenau formed in 1850 in
the state of Santa Catarina in Brazil was a prime example. So were the
Baradero and the Tornquist colonies in Argentina. Chile also
welcomed 30,000 Germans in the mid 19th century. The period of
German settlement in Latin America also coincides with the settlement
of Germans in the United States. From the mid 1850s until the 1870s,
German settlements of Latin America and the Caribbean were not
perceived by politicians in the United as a challenge to the Monroe
Doctrine because German émigrés had acquired the reputation of
assimilating very easily in their new found societies.
In 1843 Venezuela also became the stage of German settlement,
welcoming 400 Germans from none other than the state of Baden. The
Germans settled on the estate of Manuel de Tovar and their settlement
became known later as “la Colonia Tovar”. La Colonia Tovar with its
multitude of German restaurants celebrated its 150th anniversary in
1983 with fanfare, recognized as one of the touristic spots in
Venezuela. What started out as migration out of necessity for German
farmers escaping hardship became later on for the Berlin political elite
the dream of a German Reich on the other side of the Atlantic. These
various German settlements in Latin America posed initially no threat
to the Monroe Doctrine. However, by the end of the 19th century this
picture had dramatically changed. By the end of the 19th century
German settlements were backed, at least theoretically, by a
proliferation of colonial associations such as the German Colonial
League, the Pan-German league, the Navy League, the
“Kolonisationsverein”, the German Colonial Office and on a more
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pragmatic note, the “Deutscher Wirtschaftsverband For Sod und
Mittelamerika”.
The membership of these organizations increased tenfold
between the mid 1880s and the early 1890s counting among its most
active members a large percentage of retired naval officers. Politically
these organizations were on the right and far right of the political
spectrum of the Reich. They did not pay any attention to German
immigrants to North America whom they considered “lost” to
America. They focused on Latin America and the Caribbean where
they hoped to expand their empire. Among the dreamers were
Professor Ernst Hasse of Leipzig. Secretly hoping that the “stronger”
Germanic people would replace the “weaker” Spaniards in Latin
America, the head of the Pan-German League (Alldeutscher Verband)
had conceived a plan where his society would purchase large farms in
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay for the purpose of
increasing German settlements in those countries. It is worth noticing
here that his plan was not a novelty. It had already been successfully
implemented by the Anglo-Saxons against the Indians in North
America. Bearing in mind the failure of the Germans of la Colonia
Tovar to uphold their “Deutschtum” (germanity), one of the
preconditions Ernst Hasse had set was that these settlements be
established as “future colonial lands for unmixed German
populations”. Ernst Hasse is also quoted as saying : “Our future lies in
South America […] only there will we be able to found the New
Germany”.
Echoing Hasse’s sentiment, Max Ploddemann, President of the
German-Brazilian Club advocated that the Reich curb migration to
North America and direct to South America where Germans could
“remain German and stay in touch with their homeland”. Colonial
organizations and some private citizens were relentlessly exercising
pressure on the government to step up migration to South America and
to guarantee to German citizens abroad the German citizenship not
only to migrants but to their successive generations.
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The German Challenge to the Monroe Doctrine lost its Momentum
Meanwhile the German government was decreasingly
responsive to such pressures. As a matter of fact, unable to protect a
large number of citizens, in 1904 shortly before the Venezuelan
blockade the German government saw the widespread granting of
German citizenship to future generations of Germans as an impediment
to the blockade. It would have forced the Reich to be responsible for
the lives of too many German citizens abroad. Opposition to
emigration to Venezuela came from none other than Friedrich Count
zu Eulenburg, the Prussian Minister of Interior who warned the
government and his compatriots about the instability of the Venezuelan
government, its volatile political and social climate and worst of all its
“climatic conditions” ! One valid point in the Minister’s argument was
the scrupulousness of emigration speculators who tended to lure
artisans, domestic workers and farmers to the Venezuelan adventure
while taking advantage of them.
The Germans had hoped that the experience of their compatriots
in Latin America would be vastly different from that of their
compatriots of North America. It turned out that the two experiences
were very similar. Both groups assimilated in their newly found
societies. In both cases they intermarried with the local population,
deserted German schools, adopted with pride the ways of their new
home.
A Gap Between the Rhetoric of the German Colonial Societies and
the Realities faced by their Compatriots Abroad
There was a big gap between the German colonial societies that
strongly advocated a strong German colonial empire upholding
German values and the reaction of their compatriots once in their new
country. There was also a huge gap between the German colonial
societies push for emigration and the German government’s effort to
curb emigration through such laws as the Heydt-rescript. Friedrich von
Eulenburg, the Prussian Minister of Interior had publicly opposed
German emigration to Venezuela on June 22, 1875 before the
Hamburg Senate.
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Another deterrent to emigration was the Venezuelan citizenship
law that prevented new immigrants from assuming important political
posts and required a waiting period of at least two years before the
granting of citizenship status. This might seem an insignificant amount
of time in light of immigration laws practice in today’s various
industrialized nations, however, for the time it amounted to an
exceptional measure for aliens coming from a European nation.
Bismarck and Wilhelm II on the Monroe Doctrine and Roosevelt’s
Counteraction
Before Bismarck retirement, there were two philosophies in
Germany regarding German influence in Latin America, that of
Bismarck and that of Emperor Wilhelm II. While Emperor Wilhem II
harbored dreams of a German empire in Latin America and rejected
the Monroe Doctrine, Bismarck adopted a more cautious attitude and
occasionally voiced his opinion against extending German influence on
the other side of the Atlantic. Later in 1897 a retired Bismarck had
slightly rescinded his views denouncing the Monroe Doctrine as “an
insolent dogma”, “a presumptuous idea”.
It is worth noticing here that both Roosevelt and Wilhem II
decried what they described as the inefficiency of Latin American
rulers, their mediocre handling of their political and social affairs as
much as they complimented each other on their noble ideals and their
mastery of politics. In their epistolary exchange one could find to top it
all a common conviction of the superiority of their race and its ability
to rule the world.
Overall the United States had misread some of the alarming
signals that Germany was sending. The United States was completely
apathetic to Germany’s ambitions between the 1850s and the 1870s, at
the height of German migration to Latin America and the Caribbean.
On the other hand, the United States overestimated the German
possibility of fulfillment of its dream in South America and the
Caribbean in the last two decades of the 19th century and at the
beginning of the twentieth century when German migration to Latin
America and the Caribbean had decreased and Germany, far more
focused on European events, no longer obsessed about a colonial
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empire in Latin America. This is due to the fact that the United States
was listening mostly to the claims of the German colonial societies and
far less to the diminishing migration of Germans to Latin America.
Washington was also far more concerned with the sheer size of the
German Navy, the second in the world, than with the degree to which
it was politically backed at home.
The sinking of the Haitian gunboat “Crète à Pierrot” and the
German violation of Brazilian sovereignty in 1893 were examined in
Washington as clear threats to the Monroe Doctrine. The United States
paid far more attention to the remarks made by Wilhelm II on the
Monroe Doctrine than to the type of envoy he sent to Washington, an
obscure diplomat married to an American citizen. Finally on
January 17, 1903 German American relations hit an all time low when
the German gunboat “Panther” returned fire leveling Fort San Carlos in
Maracaibo, Venezuela. In 1903 a war between Germany and the
United States had been barely avoided.
The American response to the perception of German threat was
the Roosevelt Corollary of 1904. The Corollary reinforced the Monroe
Doctrine by making the United States the arbiter of disputes between
Latin American powers and European powers. Thus the United Sates
could use force “if necessary” to guaranty that Latin American powers
pay their debt to European nations.
Germany was not the only power to have difficulties with
Venezuela. At the turn of the century, Venezuela was the Black sheep
of international politics. Whether under the rule of Antonio Guzman
Blanco or under Cipriano Castro, Venezuela had been invaded twenty
two times by Colombia between 1859 and 1901. It had broken
diplomatic relations with France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Great
Britain, Germany. Reasons for the freeze in these diplomatic relations
range from Dutch assistance to rebel group, to border disputes with
Great Britain over Guyana, to Venezuela’s inability to pay its foreign
debt. All of these reasons were often intertwined. Taking advantage of
Venezuela’s weakness many European powers claimed the Central
American country. Germany was not the only country that took
military measures against Venezuela in return of its debt payment, in
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1898 Italy sent a squadron to the central American country for the
same reason.
Germany and its gunboat Diplomacy in Haiti the Batsch Case
Haiti offered a scenario that was eerily similar to that of
Venezuela. In the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, Haiti had voiced its
sympathy for its former colonizer to the disappointment of Haiti’s
sizeable opulent German population. On June 11, 1872 two German
warships, the Vineta and the Gazelle were sent to the first Black
republic on a mission to collect debts on behalf of German merchants.
The underlying intention as to intimidate the small nation and give it a
lesson in Realpolitik about Prussian power in the world in the
aftermath of the Franco-Prussian war, a muscular method customary to
powerful nations. Captain Batsch demanded the retribution of the debts
plus indemnities. When Haiti seemed to delay, the German captain
seized on the same day Haitian warships and returned them only when
the sum was gathered. “With the special finesse Hohenzollern
diplomacy reserved for people of color, the German boarding parties
left calling cards. When the Haitians were allowed back, they found
their cherished flag spread out on the bridge of each ship, smeared with
shit […] It was the republic’s first contact with the methods of German
diplomacy”. To add insult to injuries, the same captain was sent back
to Port-au-Prince a few months later for a “visit of courtesy”.
The Loders case
More telling even was the Loders case twenty-five years later. In
1897, shortly after Simon Sam was elected ruler of Haiti by his
assembly, a case similar to that of Batsch was to inflict the most
profound humiliation on Haiti.
Emile Leiders, a German national and livery stable keeper found
himself in trouble with the Haitian authorities over an unfulfilled
contract matter. Jailed and fined, he was released one month after his
arrest at the demand of Count von Schwerin, then deported to
Germany. Unsatisfied with the release, Count Schwerin, convinced of
the superiority of his people over the Haitians, wanted to take the case
further to the President of Haiti, Simon Sam, requesting that the latter
dismiss the judges and the police involved in the case. In their Book
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Written in Blood, the Heinzs describe the situation that ensued the
following way : “[…] two German warships, S.M.S. Charlotte and
Stein, anchored off Port-au-Prince, and their Commodore, Kaptan-zur-
See, August Thiele, sent word ashore that commencing at 1:00 p.m., he
would sink all Haitian warships present, destroy the Palais National,
and bombard Port-au-Prince, providing the following terms were not
acceded to a $ 20,000 indemnity to Loders, and his readmission to
Haiti” a formal apology to the German government, a 21 gun salute to
the imperial colors, and a reception at the palace for Count Schwerin.
To the diplomatic corps collective remonstrance, Thiele on his
quarterdeck coldly replied that Berlin’s orders allowed no deviations ;
unless the Haitian flag was replaced by a white flag before 1:00 p.m.,
the bombardment would proceed. Down came the colors; up went the
white flag. By four o’clock the indemnity had been scraped up, and,
one hour later, Loders came ashore. At sunset, Fort National saluted
the German flag. Schwerin, in full diplomatic tenue, stalked icily to the
palace for the reception U.S. Minister Powell called “an unpleasant
affair”.
In both instances, in the Batsch case of 1872 and in the Leiders
case of 1897, the apparent silence and the non-interventionist attitude
of the United States could seem out of character given the country’s
self appointed role in the region. This lack of intervention is best
summarized in President Roosevelt declaration of December 3, 1901,
“We do not guarantee any state against punishment if it misconduct
itself, provided that punishment does not take the form of acquisition
of territory by any non American power”. A few months prior to the
Batsch incident, the Haitians were facing a similar situation and
confronting the Spaniards over the “Hornet”, an anti-Spanish rebel
boat run by Blacks and which had found shelter in the Haitian waters.
The United States intervened escorting the boat to Baltimore for the
simple reason that it wanted Spain out of Cuba, which Southerners had
dreamt of possessing. In the case of the Germans, no matter how
unpleasant the situation might have been, from an American point of
view, it was not worth fighting for, because the Germans were not
enemies and had not officially claimed the island. They had “only”
humiliated it. Given the way Blacks were considered by Americans as
inferior, was unimportant. In light of the Roosevelt declaration, the
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American perception could even have been that Haiti was duly
punished. The utter humiliation and Haiti’s inability to fight back
could have been perceived by the United Sates, not so much as a
challenge to the Monroe Doctrine but rather as a well-deserved lesson
to a Black group that had the nerves of forming a nation. It further
confirmed both American and German opinions on the inability of non
Anglo-Saxon and non-Germanic people to govern and defend
themselves.
Germany was to test the Monroe Doctrine once more in the
summer of 1914, when its warships threatened to seize the Haitian
customhouses at Port-au-Prince, Jacmel and Cape Haitian. Initially,
Germany’s aspirations in Latin America and the Caribbean represented
a real challenge to the Monroe Doctrine. Germany’s navy, its colonial
societies and industrious merchants were indeed the engine of the
Reich’s Weltpolitik. A booming economy coupled with a dynamic
German migration to Latin America and the Caribbean had dueled
hope, among some in the Wilhelmstrasse, of building a true empire on
the other side of the Atlantic. However, at the turn of the century, there
was a gap between dream and reality. The dream was that German
migrants would remain German and uphold German values, and would
increasingly replace what they perceived as the “inferior” races, in a
manner similar to that of the Anglo-Saxon in North America. The
reality was that German immigrants assimilated into their new
environment and mixed with the local population. Another reality not
anticipated by the Berlin colonial elite was the decrease of migration
due to local laws on both sides of the Atlantic. While gunboat
diplomacy inflicted humiliation and pain to countries such as
Venezuela Haiti, it left the Monroe Doctrine almost unchallenged.
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